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MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
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Employing this type of analysis, which would take into 
account an overworked, underfunded Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, backlogged court dockets and 
other practical problems, my view is that most employees 
might well be better off with mandatory arbitration, provided 
that due process guarantees are in place and statutory reme-
dies are available. 
Due Process Concerns 
The importance of due process issues was addressed in 
the December 1994 Dunlop Commission Report on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations and in the May 
1995 Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of 
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment 
Relationship, developed jointly by a task force whose mem-
bers included representatives of the American Bar 
Association, the American Arbitration Association, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, 
the National Employment Lawyers Association and the 
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. Both the 
Dunlop Report and the Protocol contained closely parallel 
standards for arbitrating employment disputes, including: (1) 
a jointly selected arbitrator who knows the law; (2) simple, 
adequate discovery; (3) cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator 
neutrality; (4) representation by a person of the employee's 
choice; (5) remedies equal to those provided by law; (6) an 
opinion and an award, with reasons; and (7) judicial review 
on the law. 
The Dunlop Commission and the task force diverged on 
the issue of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims, with 
the Commission taking the view that the provisions of an 
employment contract should not dictate how an employee's 
statutory claim is enforced. The task force took no position 
on the issue, although it agreed that mandatory arbitration 
agreements as a condition of employment should be know-
ingly made. 
Judicial Precedent 
Court decisions on the arbitrability of statutory claims 
under pre-dispute arbitration agreements have continued to 
evolve, applying, sometimes differently, the two leading 
Supreme Court cases: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 1 
(holding that an arbitrator's adverse decision under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement did not prevent a black employee 
from pursuing Title VII claims of racial discrimination in a 
discharge, because the arbitrator was authorized only to 
decide the contractual issue, not the statutory issue), and 
Gilmer v. Interstate!Johnson Lane Corp. 2 (holding that an indi-
vidual stockbroker-employee was bound by a contract with 
the New York Stock Exchange to arbitrate an Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim against 
his employer, reasoning that the arbitrator here was autho-
rized to handle statutory as well as contractual disputes). 
The Gilmer court emphatically endorsed arbitration as a 
method of finally resolving disputes, even when the agree-
ment to arbitrate is made as a condition of employment. 
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,l the Ninth 
Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement of the 
type upheld in Gilmer, after having concluded that the 
employees did not "knowingly" waive their Title VII rights 
and remedies. By contrast, in Austin v. Owens Brockway Glass 
Container, 4 a divided Fourth Circuit held that a terminated 
employee's gender and disability discrimination suit was 
barred by the employee's failure to exhaust the arbitration 
procedures in the union contract. Similarly, 'in Cole v. Burns 
International Security Services, 5 Judge Harry Edwards, writing 
for the D.C. Circuit, held that an employee could be 
required to arbitrate Title VII racial discrimination claims 
under a mandatory arbitration clause in an individual 
employment contract, provided that the procedure was fair 
and the employer paid all the arbitrator's fees. His decision 
emphasized the difference between arbitration under an 
individual contract, where the employee controls the presen-
tation, and arbitration under a labor contract, where the 
union is in control. 
Judge Posner, writing for the Third Circuit in Pryner v. 
Tractor Supply Co.,6 similarly distinguished arbitration clauses 
in union contracts, holding that suits by former u~ion 
employees alleging claims under Title VII, the ADEA and 
the Americans With Disabilities Act, should not be stayed 
because of the arbitration provisions in the collective bar-
gaining agreements. He reasoned that Gardner-Denver con-
trolled in the union context. Most recently, in Gibson v. 
Neighborhood Health Clinics,' the Seventh Circuit held that a 
former employee did not have to arbitrate Title VII and 
ADEA claims against the employer since there was no con-
sideration to support the employee's promise to arbitrate. 
The court expressly declined to decide whether an employ-
ee's knowing and voluntary consent is a prerequisite to arbi-
trate statutory claims. 
Administrative Agency Action 
Separate from the court activity, the EEOC has recently 
declared its opposition to mandatory binding arbitration as a 
condition of employment. The National Academy of 
Arbitrators also has recently denounced mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements imposed as a condition of employment that 
require a waiver of access to the courts or an administrative 
forum. (But the Academy added that in view of existing law, 
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its members could serve as arbitrators 
in such cases, provided that they 
observe certain guidelines as to the 
fairness of the proceeding.) 
These principled concerns, howev-
er meritorious, do not take into 
account some practical problems that 
may make pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements the only real answer for 
most employees. For example, testimo-
ny presented to the Dunlop Commis-
sion indicated that employers may be 
unwilling to enter into post-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate except in the 
case of very large claims, since they 
usually prefer to wait out more "run of 
the mill" claims, assuming most of 
them will go nowhere. 
Another issue is the difficulty of 
obtaining legal representation. Many 
lawyers will not invest their time in 
statutory-discrimination court suits. 
My informal survey indicated that 
experienced lawyers accept only about 
one out of every 100 potential discrimi-
nation claimants. The EEOC workload 
and the court backlog present other 
practical problems that must be consid-
ered. Before the EEOC began classify-
ing cases in order of priority (and 
tossed out many charges after only a 
brief investigation), its backlog had 
soared past 100,000 cases. Given these 
realities, mandatory arbitration of 
statutory claims under arbitration 
agreements imposed as a condition of 
employment, if accompanied by appro-
priate due process features, should not 
be automatically rejected without fur-
ther empirical study of the actual 
effects on employee claimants. • 
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This article is adapted from the 
author's keynote address presented at the 
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Association, Section of Labor and 
Employment Law, on Aug. 4, 1997, at 
the Grand Hyatt Hotel in San Francisco. 
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table it intends to follow. Although it 
may be modified later, the schedule is 
intended to commit the tribunal 
"morally" to a schedule from the outset. 
• Requiring the tribunal, upon the 
closing of the proceedings, to indicate 
to the secretariat of the ICC Court 
when it expects to submit a draft award 
for scrutiny by that court. 
Some of the other key changes also 
reduce delay and bring the rules into 
alignment with current practice. For 
example, in multiparty cases a new 
provision gives the ICC Court the 
power to appoint the tribunal if the 
parties cannot agree on a method of 
appointment. There is a similar provi-
sion in the American Arbitration 
Association International Arbitration 
Rules and the rules of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization. 
ADR CURRENTS 
• 
Another rule permits the ICC 
Court to authorize fewer than all of the 
arbitrators to complete an arbitration 
when, after the close of proceedings, an 
arbitrator has died or otherwise been 
removed from the panel. In deciding this 
issue, the ICC Court will be required to 
take account of relevant provisions of 
applicable law, such as laws prohibiting 
arbitrations to be conducted by an even 
number of arbitrators. 
The revised rules also add provi-
sions relating to such sub-
jects as the arbitrator's 
authority to order interim 
measures, the confi-
dentiality of proceedings, 
the assertion of new 
claims, and the cor-
rection or interpretation 
of the award. 
The new ICC rules will apply to 
arbitrations commenced on or after 
Jan. 1, 1998, although parties who 
have included an ICC clause in their 
contracts prior to that date may 
choose to be subject to the old rules in 
the event an arbitration arises after 
that date. If the parties cannot agree, 
it will be up to the ICC to decide how 
these disagreements should be 
resolved. • 
